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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID McMURDIE, WILLI~ \ L E D 
WHITAKER, CAROL WHIT~ 1 01958 
TAKER, and DENISE WHITT AK.-
ER, by her Guardian Ad Litem, Wit;··--Ci , . s~j;-;~;;.~;:·c~~;t;-ut;h·----
liam Whittaker, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
ALVIN UNDERWOOD, JOSEPH 
JOHNSON, H. E. WOOLF, and 
NORTH AMERICAN VAN 
LINES, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
Respectfully submitted, 
Case No. 
8894 
E. L. SCHOENHALS, 
Attorney for Appellants 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID McMURDIE, WILLIAM 
WHITAKER, CAROL WHIT .. 
TAKER, and DENISE WHITT AK .. 
ER, by her Guardian Ad Litem, Wil .. 
liam Whittaker, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
-vs.-
ALVIN UNDERWOOD, JOSEPH 
JOHNSON, H. E. WOOLF, and 
NORTH AMERICAN VAN 
LINES, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
8894 
Three large tractor--semi trailer type motor vehicles were 
parked on the highway on December 15, 1957. About 2:30 
o'clock A.M. the first unit had difficulty with its head--
lights and parked with the wheels on the right side on the 
shoulder and the wheels on the driver's side on the paved 
portion of the highway (Ex. 6.-D.-134--23 and 218.-24.). 
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Being partially parked on the sloping shoulder this unit 
was in a tilting position. This unit is referred to as Unit 
1. Defendant .Alvin Underwood was driving Unit 2, the 
Johnson unit. Unit 2 passed Unit 1 and stopped and parked 
with all wheels on the paved portion of the highway 100 
to 150 feet ahead of Unit 1. (T. 218.-4.-Ex. 6.-D.) Under .. 
wood then walked back to Unit 1 to render assistance. 
Defendant H. E. Woolf was driving North American 
Van Lines Unit 3. Unit 3 passed units 1 and 2, and stop.-
ped and parked on the paved portion of the highway 100 
to 150 feet ahead of Unit 2. All three large tractor.-trailer 
units were facing east. Unit 1 was partially on the shoulder, 
Units 2 and 3 were parked with all wheels on the paved 
portion of the highway. Plaintiffs, all in a Nash car driven 
by William Whitaker, passed Unit 1, but because of on .. 
coming traffic, pulled up and stopped behind Unit 2 to 
permit traffic coming from the opposite direction to pass. 
(T. 138.-9.-136.-19.-142.4.) 
Units 1, 2, 3, and the Whittaker unit were all to the 
right of the center line. There was evidence by the plain .. 
tiffs and an independent witness that the Johnson unit, 
No. 2, driven by Underwood had no lights on. (T. 238 .. 22.-
24) (239.-25) (247.-18, 20, 25.) The party so testifying 
being the first to arrive, 2 or 3 minutes after the accident. 
(244.-12.) All units were facing easterly and while all were 
thus parked, Nancy Dillingham, operating a fourth car, a 
Chevrolet pickup truck, passed Unit 1 and cut back in 
to the right side to avoid traffic approaching from the op.-
posite direction, (254 .. 10), and ran into the rear of the 
Whittaker Nash car parked behind Unit 2, forcing it 
against Unit 2 resulting in the injuries and damages. The 
pre.-trial order found Nancy Dillingham negligent. 
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Nancy Dillingham settled with plaintiffs, and plaintiffs 
proceeded against the remaining defendants. The jury re .. 
turned a verdict no case for action. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. ERROR IN INSTRUCfiNG THAT NANCY DIL .. 
LINGHAM WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, AND LATER INSTRUCfiNG THAT IF SHE 
WAS NEGLIGENT, HER NEGLIGENCE WAS THE 
SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE AND TO FIND IN FA .. 
VOR OF DEFENDANTS. 
2. REFUSAL TO INSTRUCf ON POSSIBILITY OF 
SO PARKING AS CONSTITUTING A TRAP OR 
DANGER. 
3. ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THAT DEFEND .. 
ANTS WERE UNDER NO DUTY TO PLACE LIGHT .. 
ED FLARES AROUND VEHICLES. 
4. REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT JURY OF DUTY TO 
PROCEED UNTIL THE DEFENDANTS COULD 
SAFELY PARK OFF THE HIGHWAY. 
5. REFUSAL TO DEFINE THE WORD "PRACTI .. 
CABLE" AS NOT BEING SYNONYMOUS WITH 
CONVENIENT. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THAT NANCY DIL .. 
LINGHAM WAS NEGLIGENT AS A MATTER OF 
LAW, AND LATER INSTRUCfiNG THAT IF SHE 
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WAS NEGLIGENT, HER NEGLIGENCE WAS THE 
SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE AND TO FIND IN FA .. 
VOR OF DEFENDANTS. 
In Instruction 6(T..-80) the court instructed the jury 
that Nancy Dillingham, the driver of the pickup truck, was 
negligent as a matter of law as found in the pre..-trial order. 
The court instructed the jury in Instruction 27 (T .. l03) 
as follows: 
"You are instructed that the driver of the pick.-
up truck was negligent as a matter of law, and if 
you find that she observed the hazards, if any, of 
the stopped vehicles upon the highway or under 
the circumstances should have observed said ve .. 
hides, but because of her negligence failed to do so 
in time to avoid said accident, then you are instruct .. 
ed that the negligence on her part was the sole 
proximate cause of the collision, and your verdict 
must be in favor of the defendants and against the 
plaintiffs, no cause of action." 
Instruction 27 was excepted to and the court invited 
to change it (T..-303.-14). 
Under such an instruction the court took away from 
the jury any question of concurrent contributing negligence 
on the part of the defendants and whether defendants' 
negligence was a contributing proximate cause. It is the 
perogative of the jury to determine whether under the 
facts defendants and respondents were negligent, and 
whether or not negligence of the defendants proximately 
contributed to the resulting injuries and damages. 
The court's instructions constitute a directed verdict 
against plaintiffs. This is an invasion of the provence of 
the jury and error. 
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POINT 2 
REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT ON FORESEEABILITY 
OF PARKING AS CONSTITUTING A TRAP OR 
DANGER. 
The court erred in refusing to give requested instruc.-
tion 10 (T 49). This instruction requested the court to in.-
struct the jury that if they should find from a preponder.-
ance of the evidence that an ordinary prudent person 
should have foreseen that so parking a series of large units 
was likely to result in injury, or that the ordinary prudent 
person could have foreseen that the placing of a solid 
wall of trucks without using lanterns or flares, or by reason 
of spacing would be foreseeable as a likely trap or danger 
to traffic was certainly a proper request. 
Refused request no 12 (T .-51) is copied in part from 
Hillyard vs. Utah By.-Products, 263 P2d at 287, 1 U2d 143. 
Under this instruction negligence is defined as exposing 
another to unreasonable risk or harm or foreseeable con.-
duct whether it be innocent negligence or criminal, and 
since the Supreme Court has defined it so at page 290 
refusal to so instruct was error. See request no. 14 (T.-53). 
It was error not to instruct that it is not necessary to foresee 
the exact form in which the accident happened from the 
Hillyard case above, quote: 
"The test of liability is not whether . . . the 
defendant could ... have foreseen the precise form 
in which the injury actually happened, but he must 
be held for anything which ... appears to have 
been a natural and probable consequence of his 
act. If the act is one which [he] ... could have 
anticipated as likely to result in injury . . . ". 
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Error in refusal to give request 17 (T --56) on the ques .. 
tion of whether or not it was foreseeable that a series of 
large units so parked might likely result in injury. See 
Shelton v. Lowell, 249 P2d 958, Ore. 
"The question is: could the defendants have 
foreseen in the exercise of ordinary care that their 
act in leaving the truck on the highway without a 
warning flag being placed 300 feet to the south or 
at the curve on the highway would naturally and 
probably result in harm of some kind to another." 
Plaintiffs are entitled to have the court instruct the 
jury in such a manner that the theory of plaintiffs' case 
may be presented to the jury, Miller v. Southern Pacific, 
21 P2d 865, 82 U 46. 
"Each party to a law suit is entitled to advocate 
his theory and on submission to the jury is en.-
titled to a submission of it upon his theory, and 
have the jury instructed on his theory, and the 
law as applicable to such theory; but such right 
does not include therein the right to develop a 
theory of law for the particular case. . " 
POINT 3 
ERROR IN INSTRUCTING THAT THE DEFEND .. 
ANTS WERE UNDER NO DUTY TO PLACE LIGHT .. 
ED FLARES AROUND VEHICLES. 
Plaintiffs' requested instructions no. 18, 19, 34, and 
35 requested the court to permit the jury to determine 
whether under the facts and circumstances the defendants 
were negligent in not placing lighted flares on the road. 
The court refused all these requests. Defendants Alvin 
Underwood and Joseph Johnson admit they were parked 
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on the highway fifteen ( 15) minutes-see Answers to 
Interrogatories T.-32.-13 also under evidence. There was 
evidence Unit 2 had no lights on. Under Instruction No. 
23 the court instructed: 
"They were under no duty to place lighted 
flares around the vehicles." 
Under this point the court erred for three reasons: 
1. It does not require an act of the legislature to create 
a duty, the violation of which constitutes negligence. There 
is no statute requiring a motorist to keep a proper lookout. 
Yet it would be error for the court to instruct that a de .. 
fendant was under no duty to keep a lookout. Large units 
60 feet long and 8 feet wide owe a greater duty when 
parked than does a smaller car. Whether or not the defend .. 
ants were under a duty to place out flares depends on all 
the circumstances, and the plaintiffs were entitled to go 
to the jury on the question of whether three large units 
parked in a series under the evidence and without flares 
constituted negligence. The jury might have found that 
a motorist could believe he could safely pass one or two 
units and find himself in a trap, unable to pass the second 
or the third unit because of traffic in the opposite direction. 
It was therefore error for the court to instruct the jury 
that the defendants were under no duty, because a duty 
can be imposed upon a person with respect to a foreseeable 
conduct likely to expose another to risk or harm whether 
there is a statute imposing such a duty or not. Moreover, 
Nancy Dillingham testified that as she approached, the 
parked tractor.-trailer appeared to be moving and because 
"they were on open highway" T.-252.-11, 15, 26. Flares 
out would have left no question in her mind on this point, 
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she was very near the unit when she first learned it was 
not moving. T--254--10. 
2. The State law requires disabled tractor--trailers to 
place out flares. The mere fact that the defendant were 
not disabled does not relieve them from such responsibility. 
41--6--101 U.C.A. 53 prohibits a vehicle not disabled from 
parking on the highway. 41--6--152 requires disabled ve .. 
hides of the types involved to place out flares. Certainly 
where there is a prohibition of parking where practical to 
park off the pavement, it follows that the legislature did 
not intend to license vehicles not disabled to park without 
placing out flares or to park on the pavement of the high .. 
way in the night without placing of flares, or warnings. 
3. Defendants were non--residents engaged in interstate 
commerce, see Paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the Amended 
Complaint, T--1, Notice of Service, T--9, and Affidavit, T--6. 
Defendant Alvin Underwood testified he knew the law 
required, if disabled, that flares be placed out. T--279.-25. 
Underwood was there assisting a disabled vehicle for fifteen 
minutes. Defendants did not put out flares or suggest to 
the disabled vehicle's operator that he put out flares. T.-277 .. 
22 to 278.-11 inclusive. Defendants did not put out any 
flares. T.-252.-28. Federal Law requires the defendants to 
place out flares. Regulations of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission have the force and effect of law. Woods vs. 
New York City, 88 NE2d 740: 
"Under that act the Interstate Commerce Com.-
mission is empowered to make rules and regula .. 
tions . . . These regulations have the force of law 
and are judicially noticed.-317 US 481. Strict com.-
pliance with the rules and specifications, etc." 
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Williams vs. New York Central, 84 NE2d at 403: 
"The rules adopted by Interstate Commerce 
Commission ... are as integral part of the act 
and have the force of the statute. . . . " 
The regulations of the Interstate Commerce Commis--
sion are as follows: 
s 192.23 
"Emergency Signals: Stopped or parked ve--
hicles. Whenever for any cause other than disable--
ment or necessary traffic stops, any motor vehicle 
is stopped upon the traveled portion of any high--
way, or shoulder thereof, during the time lights 
are required except within a municipality where 
there is sufficient highway lighting to make clearly 
discernible persons and vehicles on the highway 
at a distance of 500 feet, the following require--
ments shall be observed: 
(a) The driver of such vehicle shall immediate--
ly place on the traveled side of the vehicle, a lighted 
/usee, a lighted red electric lantern, or a red emer--
gency reflector." 
These regulations have the force and effect of law. 
The case of TWA vs. Northland Greyhound, 275 NW 
846, held that the question of whether or not flares should 
have been placed out is a jury question. 
POINT 4 
REFUSAL TO INSTRUCT THE JURY OF DUTY 
TO PROCEED UNTIL DEFENDANTS COULD SAFE--
LY PARK OFF THE HIGHWAY. 
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41.-6.-101 UCA 1953 provides as follows: 
" ... No person shall stop, park, or leave stand .. 
ing any vehicle, whether attended or unattended 
upon the paved or main traveled part of the high .. 
way when it is PRACTICAL to stop, park, or 
leave such vehicle off such part of said highway." 
Failure to give requested instruction (20(T.-59) that de .. 
fendants had a duty to proceed forward until they could 
safely take their vehicles off the paved portion of the high .. 
way was error. Refusal to give request 21 (T.-60) was also 
error. The latter stating that the rendering of assistance 
does not relieve the defendants of responsibility so far 
as negligence is concerned, see Gorego vs. Cornwall, 222 
P2d 606. Defendants did not even consider driving ahead 
300 or 400 feet to see if he could park off the road (T.-295.-
6), yet the court took this from the jury's consideration. 
The court even refused to permit testimony on the issue 
to show the road was wide enough to park off just imme .. 
diately a few hundred feet ahead, and labeled it as "unfair" 
to show this (T.-301.-1). 
Failure to give requested instruction no. 13 was error. 
This request was copied from Hillard vs. Utah By.-Products, 
supra, wherein the court stated: 
"The parking of a vehicle upon the paved or 
traveled portion of a highway is generally regarded 
as a hazard to traffic thereon. . . . " 
The jury was led to believe that the defendants could park 
any place they pleased on the highway by the court's re .. 
fusal to instruct as requested. This is particularly true in 
light of Point 5 which follows. See also Borgert vs. Spurling, 
230 P2d 183. 
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"Alvin Fox clearly violated the parking statute. 
His car was not disabled, and, Good Samaritan 
though he was, his generous impulses afforded him 
no exemption from the statute's command .... " 
The evidence was that defendants could have pulled off 
the highway at a lighted motel 2, 3, or 4 blocks ahead, 
T .. 240 .. 7. 
POINT 5 
REFUSAL TO DEFINE THE WORD "PRACTI .. 
CABLE AS NOT BEING SYNONYMOUS WITH CON .. 
VENIENT. 
The statute quoted under point 4 uses the word practi.-
cal. Refusal of request no. 1 was error. The jury should 
have been instructed that the word practical is not synony .. 
mous with convenient and 60 C.}.S. 773, Note 69 was 
quoted at the bottom of the instruction where the law 
requires such an instruction. 
The court refused to instruct the jury that the word 
practicable was not synonymous with convenient, or at 
all on this point. The jury was left with the impression 
that the defendants could park any placed they pleased 
without regard to the safety to others, since the court re .. 
fused to define practical as other courts have. 
Respectfully submitted, 
E. L. SCHOENHALS, 
Attorney for Appellants 
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